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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dwayne Joseph Farr pied guilty to one count of
felony domestic battery. He received a unified sentence of eight years, with three years
fixed. Although the district court initially retained jurisdiction, following Mr. Farr's "rider,"
it ultimately relinquished jurisdiction.
On appeal, Mr. Farr argues that the district court acted in manifest disregard of
the pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it
failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Farr prior to sentencing.
Mr. Farr also contends that the district court erred when it relinquished its retained
jurisdiction.

He further contends the district court abused its discretion in failing to

reduce his sentence in light of Mr. Farr's mental health issues and other mitigating
factors as well as the additional information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On the morning of October 28, 2011, law enforcement officials responded to a
report that Mr. Farr and his wife had an altercation. (Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI), 1 p.3.) Mr. Farr was intoxicated and had become physically violent

with his wife, Gena Farr.

(PSI, p.3.)

As Ms. Farr was leaving the residence, he

threatened her with a kitchen knife. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Farr was charged by Information
with one count of felony domestic battery, one count of attempted strangulation of a

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file containing
the APSI, the PSI, and all included attachments. These documents will hereinafter be
described as the "PSI" for ease of reference.

1

household

member,

and

one

count of aggravated

assault with

a weapons

enhancement. (R., pp.53-55.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Farr pied guilty to the felony domestic battery
charge and the other charges were dismissed.

(12/21/11 Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.8, L.20,

p.10, Ls.5-8, p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.5; R., pp.47, 49-52, 59-60.) Although the terms of the
plea agreement provided that the State agreed to recommend probation and local jail,
the plea agreement also contained a provision which required Mr. Farr to abide by Court
orders and the conditions of his release. (12/21/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.10-16; R., pp.4, 49527.) If he failed to do so, the State would no longer be bound to recommend probation
and only local jail.

(12/21/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.12-16.)

Further, a no contact order was

entered which prohibited Mr. Farr from contacting the victim in the domestic battery
case, Gena Farr. (R., pp.37, 40.) Compliance with the no contact order was one term
and condition of Mr. Farr's release from custody. (12/21/11 Tr., p.14, L.19-p.15, L.18.)
The district court ordered a substance abuse evaluation 2 and a domestic violence
evaluation. 3 (R., p.62.)
At sentencing, the State asked to be released from the plea agreement as
Mr. Farr had been charged with violating the no contact order prior to his sentencing
hearing. (2/17/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-25.) Defense counsel did not object and the district

A substance abuse evaluation was ordered for the sentencing in a misdemeanor
excessive DUI and misdemeanor injury to child case, Kootenai County case number CR
2010-24906, that was set to be sentenced at the same hearing. (12/21/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.4
- p.6, L.24; R., pp.64-65.) Defense counsel suggested that the substance abuse
evaluation could be used at the sentencing for both the misdemeanor and felony
charges. (12/21/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.10-13.)
3 A domestic violence evaluation was ordered, but it was determined that Mr. Farr would
get a domestic violence and substance abuse evaluation combined.
(12/21/11
Tr., p.13, Ls.4-16.) The domestic violence evaluation was not part of the record on
appeal and it does not appear that the district court received or considered the
evaluation.
2

2

court imposed upon Mr. Farr a sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (2/17/12
Tr., p.12, Ls.2-6; R., pp.66-68.) The district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Farr's
case. (2/17/12 Tr., p.12, L.6; R., pp.66-70.)
During the period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Farr attended his programs and
completed his assignments; however, while on the rider, he attempted numerous times
to contact his children by calling his wife's cell phone, and his wife was a person
protected from being contacted by Mr. Farr through a no contact order.

(PSI, p.54;

R., pp.75-77.) Therefore the Idaho Department of Correction removed Mr. Farr from the
CAPP facility and recommended that Mr. Farr's retained jurisdiction be relinquished.
(PSI, pp.53-54; R., p.75.) The district court held a review hearing so that Mr. Farr could
present evidence and testimony to aid the district court in determining whether Mr. Farr
violated the conditions of his retained jurisdiction. (See generally 10/5/12 Tr.; R., pp.8387.) At his rider review hearing, Mr. Farr's wife and two corrections officers testified.
(See generally 7/24/12 Tr.) In spite of Mr. Farr's performance on his rider, 4 the district

court decided to relinquish jurisdiction. (10/5/12 Tr., p.46, Ls.16-17; R., pp.91-92.)
Mr. Farr then filed a timely I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence
(hereinafter, Rule 35). (Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 5)

The district court held a hearing, during which Mr. Farr testified via telephone and asked
either to be placed on probation or to serve another period of retained jurisdiction so he
could continue receiving programming. (2/28/13 Tr., p.4, L.17- p.14, L.17.) The district

Mr. Farr was completing his assignments and appeared to be well on his way to
completing a successful rider. (PSI, p.54.)
5 Attached to the Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof, filed February 26, 2013.
4

3

court denied Mr. Farr's Rule 35 motion. (Order, p.1. 6) Mr. Farr appeals from the district
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35
motion. (R., pp.94-96.)

Attached to the Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof, filed February 26, 2013.

6

4

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court act in manifest disregard for the pertinent provisions of
I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it failed to sua sponte
order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Farr prior to sentencing?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished its retained
jurisdiction over Mr. Farr?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Farr's Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Acted In Manifest Disregard Of I.C.R. 32 And I.C. § 19-2522. When It
Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Mr. Farr Prior To
Sentencing

A.

Introduction
Mr. Farr suffers from serious mental health problems, which appear to have been

undiagnosed and untreated. His mental health issues were so apparent that the PSI
investigator, as well as the substance abuse evaluator, both recommended that Mr. Farr
receive a mental health evaluation. Further, Mr. Farr's wife, the victim in this offense,
also asked that Mr. Farr receive mental health treatment.

Despite these clear

indications that Mr. Farr's mental health was at issue, the district court only ordered
substance abuse and domestic battery evaluations; 7 it failed to order a mental health
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522.
At sentencing, defense counsel pointed out that the victim in the case, Mr. Farr's
wife, ultimately wanted Mr. Farr to receive mental health treatment. (2/17/12 Tr., p.8,
Ls.5-7; PSI, p.5.)

Further, defense counsel also noted that Mr. Farr has asked for

mental health treatment during his interview with the presentence investigator. (2/17/12
Tr., p.8, Ls.7-10; PSI, p.16.) In fact, defense counsel asked that Mr. Farr be placed on
probation and as a condition of probation be required to apply to mental health court or
drug court. (2/17/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.4-8.) However, the district court failed to consider the
facts of Mr. Farr's crime or the requests for mental health treatment by:

the victim,

Mr. Farr, defense counsel, the presentence investigator, and the substance abuse

6

evaluator. The district court did not order a mental health evaluation, and made no
mention of Mr. Farr's mental health before it sentenced Mr. Farr.
Thus, the extent of Mr. Farr's mental health condition and the role it should play
in fashioning Mr. Farr's sentence was never fully explored in a mental health evaluation.
Accordingly, the district court manifestly disregarded the relevant portions of I.C.R. 32
and I.C. § 19-2522 when it failed to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to
1.C. § 19-2522.

B.

The District Court Acted In Manifest Disregard Of I.C.R. 32 And I.C. § 19-2522,
When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Mr. Farr
Prior To Sentencing
"After the determination of guilt it is essential that the court receive adequate

information about the defendant before handing down the sentence. Individualizing
sentences is impossible without such information." State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876,
878 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Before imposing a sentence, the court
may appoint a psychologist to examine and report on the mental condition of the
defendant. See I.C. § 19-2522; I.C.R. 32(d); McFarland, 125 Idaho 878-79. The legal
standards governing the district court's decision whether to order a psychological
evaluation and report are contained in I.C. §19-2522:
(1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will
be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court
shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to
examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant.
(3) The report of the examination shall include the following:
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;

7

Although a domestic violence evaluation was ordered, and Mr. Farr was interviewed
on February 2, 2012, no report was received by the presentence investigator or the
court. (PSI, pp.16-17.)
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(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of
the defendant;
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect
and level of functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the
defendant's mental condition;
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or
nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may
create for the public if at large.

"The requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 are complimented by Idaho Criminal Rule
32 which specifies the elements to be included in the presentence report. These
elements include information on the health of the defendant where relevant to the
sentencing decision,

I.C.R. 32(b)(8), and, where appropriate, the presentence

investigator's analysis and recommendation regarding a psychological examination,
I.C.R. 32(b)(10)." State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (2010).
The decision whether to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 192522 is discretionary with the district court. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408,
409 (Ct. App. 2007).

However, as with any exercise of discretion, the district court's

determination must be consistent with applicable legal standards. State v. Coonts, 137
Idaho 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2002). "The legal standards governing the court's decision
whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. § 19-2522."

Collins, 144 Idaho at 409.

Idaho Code § 19-2522 provides that a mental health

evaluation is mandatory, rather than discretionary, if there is reason to believe that the
mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good
cause shown.

Coonts, 137 Idaho at 152; State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879

(Ct. App. 1994). A reviewing court will uphold the failure of the district court to order a
8

mental health evaluation if the record supports the finding that there was no reason to
believe that the defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing
or if the information already before the district court meets the requirements of I.C. § 192522. State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2002). "Where a defendant did not
request a psychological evaluation or object to the absence of such an evaluation in the
PSI, the defendant must demonstrate that by failing to order such an evaluation the
sentencing court manifestly disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32." Jockumsen, 148,
Idaho at 822 (citations omitted).
In this case, the record is replete with indications that Mr. Farr suffered from
severe mental health issues. Mr. Farr's uncharacteristic actions on the morning of the
incident and the impressions of the police officers who arrested him demonstrate that
Mr. Farr may have undiagnosed mental health issues. That morning, Mr. Farr appeared
disoriented and officers, after observing his condition, asked him if he needed medical
attention.

(PSI, p.4.)

Further, Mr. Farr asked for mental health treatment when

interviewed by his presentencing investigator. (PSI, p.16.) Mr. Farr, when asked about
his mental health by the presentence investigator, said that he had not had any
psychological counseling but he would welcome it to help him understand "why [his]
mood swings." (PSI, p.16.) The presentence investigator concluded:
Based on the Defendant's description of his having extreme mood swings,
paranoia, irrational fears, an obsessive need to control his environment,
and his recent violent actions towards his wife, it appears he would benefit
from a Mental Health (Psychological) Evaluation.
(PSI, p.17.)

She went on to say that Mr. Farr was in need of long-term intensive

inpatient treatment to address his mental health and substance abuse issues.
p.20.)

9

(PSI,

Additionally, the substance abuse evaluator concluded that Mr. Farr suffered
from serious mental health issues. The substance abuse evaluator noted that Mr. Farr
"appears to be struggling with mental health symptoms needing to be processed,
examined, and monitored by a mental health specialist." (PSI, p.50.) The substance
abuse evaluator recommended that Mr. Farr obtain intensive outpatient treatment to
allow him the opportunity to address his mental health issues under the direct
supervision of professional staff members. (PSI, p.50.)
Mr. Farr's wife stated that Mr. Farr had mental health issues as a result of his
service in the Army Special Forces. 8 (PSI, p.3.) She stated that Mr. Farr needs mental
health counseling. (PSI, p.5.) She reported that Mr. Farr's extreme mood swings and
irrational behavior were escalating. (PSI, pp.5-6.) She said that Mr. Farr would sink
into an angry depression and would become extremely paranoid that Ms. Farr might
cheat on him. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Farr would then return to "normal" and say that he knew
Ms. Farr would never cheat on him. (PSI, p.5.) Ms. Farr said that Mr. Farr has a severe
drinking problem and experiences extreme mood swings. (PSI, p.5.) The morning of
the incident, Mr. Farr began saying things that did not make any sense. 9 (PSI, p.5.)
Further, Ms. Farr also stated that Mr. Farr frequently had nightmares in which he would
summersault into a standing position with a machine gun stance, would speak in a
foreign language, and act like he was shooting people in the jungle.

(PSI, p.14.)

Mr. Farr admitted that he has never been in the Special Forces, although his father
was in the military. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Farr also served as a volunteer fire fighter and told
the presentence investigator that he "witnessed horrific things happening to people in
fires or other emergencies" while working in that capacity. (PSI, p.20.)
9 Mr. Farr later told the presentence investigator that it was important "to be me again."
(PSI, p.19.)
8
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Ms. Farr told police that she thinks something is wrong with Mr. Farr and that he needs
help. (PSI, p.26.)
However, Mr. Farr never received the comprehensive mental health evaluation
which was deemed necessary by the PSI investigator and the substance abuse
evaluator, and requested by the victim of Mr. Farr's crime.
Mr. Farr's mental health should have been a significant mitigating factor at
sentencing, but the district court may have viewed Mr. Farr's actions attributable to his
mental health condition as an aggravating factor instead.

At sentencing, the district

court stated: "I find the facts to be shocking. They're alarming." (12/17/12 Tr., p.11,
L.19.) There never was an official diagnosis that Mr. Farr suffered from a mental health
condition.

However, Mr. Farr's mental health issues were raised both prior to, and

during, sentencing, and the district court relied on Mr. Farr's actions on the morning of
the incident when fashioning his sentence.
The limited information before the district court at sentencing does not function
as an adequate substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. As stated above, the
substance abuse evaluation stated that Mr. Farr "appears to be struggling with mental
health symptoms needing to be processed, examined, and monitored by a mental
health specialist."

(PSI, p.50.)

The substance abuse evaluator recommended that

Mr. Farr obtain intensive outpatient treatment to allow him the opportunity to remain
clean and sober while addressing his mental health issues under the direct supervision
of professional staff members.

(PSI, p.50.) Although the substance abuse evaluator

noted that it would be important to obtain Mr. Farr's mental health records to determine
the extent of his mental health issues and his needs for treatment, it does not appear
that the substance abuse evaluator ever requested or received Mr. Farr's records. (PSI,
11

p.43.) Further, the substance abuse evaluator held a a Master's in Social Work degree,
and she was not a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, as required by I.C. § 19-2522.
Therefore, there never was a mental health evaluation which diagnosed the extent of
Mr. Farr's mental illness or complied with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. Although
the substance abuse evaluation mentioned Mr. Farr's mental health, it did not inform the
court on all of the I.C. § 19-2522 factors, such as consideration of whether treatment is
available for a defendant's mental condition, the relative risks and benefits of treatment
or nontreatment, and the risk of danger that the defendant presents to the public.
One of the problems with the lack of a mental health evaluation is that the
sentence is not properly reflective of potential mitigating evidence.

Had Mr. Farr

received a mental health evaluation, treatment could have been geared toward treating
both his mental health and his substance abuse. The district court noted that it was
sentencing Mr. Farr to prison in order to rehabilitate him as well as to protect the public.
(12/17/12 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-4.)

Yet, the district court had no basis on which to determine

whether the acts that resulted in Mr. Farr's criminal charge were attributable to mental
health condition, substance abuse problems, or anger issues, and whether Mr. Farr
could successfully be rehabilitated without treating his mental health condition. This is
the very scenario I.C. § 19-2522 was created to prevent. In fact, I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d)
requires a mental health report to include "[a] consideration of whether treatment is
available for the defendant's mental condition, " and I.C. § 19-2522(3)(e) requires "[a]n
analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment." In this case
none of this information was before the district court at sentencing.

Therefore, the

district court should have ordered a full I. C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation.

12

In sum, the district court was provided with both a PSI and a substance abuse
evaluation that put the court on notice that trained professionals believed that Mr. Farr
might suffer from a mental health condition. Further, both statements from the victim in
this case and Mr. Farr himself indicated that Mr. Farr's mental health was deteriorating
and, thus, could have been the reason for the incident. Additionally, Mr. Farr's odd
behavior the morning of the incident should have provided additional impetus for the
district court to order a mental health evaluation. However, no mental health evaluation
was ever ordered.
At sentencing, the district court solely focused on the acts constituting the crime
and did not address Mr. Farr's possible mental illness when it sentenced him to a period
of retained jurisdiction. Because, Mr. Farr's undiagnosed mental illness may have been
a significant factor in the commission of the crime and at sentencing, and since there
was never a I.C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation ordered, the district court acted in
manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32, which requires the elements of I.C. § 19-2522 be
included in the PSI when a defendant's mental health is a significant factor at
sentencing, and, thus, this case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing in
which a mental health evaluation is ordered.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Farr Without Reducing His Sentence
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.

State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001 ). "The decision to place a defendant on probation or

whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the
13

sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion."

State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 2010).

Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court reviews
the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original judgment. Id.
at 289.
Mr. Farr contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing
jurisdiction without reducing his sentence in light of his limited success on the retained
jurisdiction program, his recognition of a problem, and his rehabilitative potential.
Mr. Farr recognizes that his period of retained jurisdiction was not as successful
as desired. However, he did have some limited successes during the period of retained
jurisdiction. There were several positive notes in his file indicating that Mr. Farr was
performing quite well on the rider, prior to the discovery that Mr. Farr was attempting to
contact a person protected by a no contact order.

Mr. Farr was compliant and

participative during his time on the retained jurisdiction. (R., p.54.) The CAPP Rider
Review and Recommendations Form indicated that "[h]e completed exercises on time
and took part in group discussions without needing to be prompted." (R., p.54.)
However, because Mr. Farr attempted to contact his children by calling his wife's
phone, the Idaho Department of Correction clinical team recommended that the district
court relinquish its jurisdiction over Mr. Farr. (10/5/12 Tr., p.40, Ls.4-10; R., pp.53-55.)
Notably, once Mr. Farr was ordered to stop calling his wife's phone, he ceased calling
immediately. (R., p.54; 10/5/12 Tr., p.31, Ls.3-6, p.40, Ls.13-18.)
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court
that demonstrates Mr. Farr's significant rehabilitative potential, as well as his limited
successes while on his rider, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua
14

sponte reduce Mr. Farr's sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon

relinquishing jurisdiction over his case.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Farr's Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New Information Presented At The Rule 35
Hearing
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Mr. Farr asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating
factors that exist in his case. From the outset, one of the most striking facts regarding
Mr. Farr is his status as a first time felony offender at the time of the alleged offense he had no prior felony convictions, but his wife felt that his behavior had been
escalating. (PSI, pp.3, 5-6.) Further, Mr. Farr had just gotten out of a rehabilitation
facility for his substance abuse issues. (PSI, p.1.) He knew that he had a problem
abusing alcohol and he was trying to get help for it. This absence of a lengthy criminal
history, coupled with Mr. Farr's motivation for treatment at the time of the alleged
offense, shows that Mr. Farr has great potential for rehabilitation in the future.
Although Mr. Farr had not been diagnosed with a mental health condition, the
facts of this case and subsequent evaluations show that Mr. Farr was experiencing
15

extreme mood swings, paranoia, irrational fears, and an obsessive need to control his
environment; thus it appears that Mr. Farr is suffering from serious underlying mental
health conditions. (PSI, p.17.) The Idaho Supreme Court has recently recognized that
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness
as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).

In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence

based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem."
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and

alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). The majority of
Mr. Farr's criminal activity has been while under the influence of alcohol. (PSI, pp.7-8.)
Mr. Farr first used alcohol when he was seventeen years old, but rarely drank until
2008, at which time he was no longer working and began drinking heavily to combat his
feelings of failure stemming from being unemployed. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Farr realizes that
he has a problem with alcohol and wants to stop drinking. (PSI, p.17.) In fact, Mr. Farr
had recently returned from a voluntary 40-day stay in a substance abuse/anger
management rehabilitation facility in Florida prior to this incident. (PSI, pp.3, 17.)
Furthermore, this is Mr. Farr's first felony offense.

(PSI, p.8.)

The Idaho

Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be accorded more lenient
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treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998); see
also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).

The defendant in Hoskins pied guilty to two counts of drawing a check without
funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the defendant pied guilty to the charge of
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. In both Hoskins and
Nice, the court considered, among other important factors, that the defendants had no

prior felony convictions.

Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90.

The

Hoskins Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense and the

absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its discretion in
imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675.
Additionally, Mr. Farr has expressed his remorse for committing the instant
offense. Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). In State v.
Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed "[i]n light of Alberts'

expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to
accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204.
See also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence of first time
offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his
rehabilitation efforts); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988)
(reducing sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility, expressed
remorse, and had been of good character before the offense at issue) reversed on other
grounds, State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295 (1990).
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Mr. Farr expressed considerable remorse to the court for committing the instant
offense:
I need some help and I really am sorry for hurting my wife. She's been
through enough. I think it's time I just, I guess in layman's terms, pay the
piper and get the help.

I want to be the person I used to be again. And I don't want to see my
wife go through any more pain than I've already caused, whatsoever. And
if there's any questions on the reports, my wife has never been a liar,
ever, so whatever she said in there is true."
(2/16/12 Tr., p.9, L.23-p.10, L.14.)
Mr. Farr asserts that had the district court properly considered his remorse,
desire for treatment, and mental health issues, it would have reduced his sentence
pursuant to his Rule 35 motion. He further asserts that his sentence should have been
reduced in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion.
Mr. Farr asserts that the district court's denial of his motion for a sentence modification
represents an abuse of discretion.
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Farr testified at the Rule 35
hearing regarding his time in custody. (2/8/13 Tr., p.6, L.7 - p.11, L.25.) Mr. Farr has
benefitted from completing both a Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT) program and an
anger management program since he was sentenced. (2/8/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-19, p.7,
Ls.7-15.) Mr. Farr stated that the MRT program changed his way of thinking and he
feels considerable remorse for his selfish behaviors.

(2/8/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-20.)

Mr. Farr informed the district court that he is using the skills and information obtained
during his programming; he has learned how to vent his anger and make healthy
choices. (2/8/13 Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.4.) This demonstrates that Mr. Farr is actively
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putting to use the information he learned from the prison programming. He is trying to
use this information to better himself.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing
to reduce Mr. Farr's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Farr respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing.

Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his

sentence as it deems appropriate. Mr. Farr requests that the order denying his Rule 35
motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of June, 2013.

SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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